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Blame-Do You Know It When You See It?
Patricia Ebright
Assistant Professor, Indiana University School of Nursing, Indianapolis, Ind.

Kathryn Rapala
Director, Risk Management and Patient Safety, Clarian Health Partners, Indianapolis, Ind.

The landmark Institute of Medicine Report, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health Care System.
stated that medical error causes 44,000 to 98,000 deaths per year. 1 There is no question that the
report raised awareness of patient safety and stressed the importance of patient outcomes.
Heightened awareness has produced a patient safety industry of sorts, with solutions that range
from technology to outcomes measurement.
Regulatory bodies, such as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO), have recognized the need for patient safety to be embedded in the culture of healthcare
organizations. In particular, the JCAHO has encouraged use of the root cause analysis process for
investigating near miss and adverse events. This process emphasizes learning from system analysis
over assigning individual blame, an approach used successfully in such high reliability organizations
as the aviation industry and the military. 2,3 Many healthcare organizations have formulated
nonpunitive reporting policies to encourage error reporting and to identify systems issues. This
article discusses the importance of a work complexity and human factors focus, how blame will

continue to surface as patient safety efforts are implemented, and implications for outcomes
management.

Removing Blame
Although policies, organizational assessments, and regulations are an important starting point for
best practice, these steps are neither sufficient to ensure changes in attitudes and behaviors related
to human error nor adequate to deal with the implications of human factors inherent in real work
situations. Even when an organization chooses to move beyond policies and truly embrace a change
in culture, blame is not easily eliminated. Understanding the complexity of real work and the limits
of human performance is essential to establishing and maintaining a nonpunitive culture and,
subsequently, positive patient outcomes.

Human Performance and Complexity of Work
Understanding a near miss or adverse event, as well as the human decisions and performance
that preceded it, requires understanding of the context or the situation surrounding the event. Near
misses and errors occur when multiple gaps align despite an organization's well-intentioned
defenses. Examples of the latter include policies, procedures, regulations, and budget. Practitioners
work in dynamic, evolving situations, confronted by goal conflicts, obstacles, hazards, missing or
ambiguous information, and co-worker behavior. 4 In most instances, practitioners practice
successfully by adapting, anticipating, accommodating, reacting, and coping to produce desired and
safe outcomes.
A fundamental principle of human factors is that humans have limitations. Essential to any event
review is the recognition that the complexity surrounding the situation is a contributor to an adverse
event. It is important not to dismiss complexity by implying that practitioners can do things a certain
way even if overwhelmed in any situation. In complex work situations, a predictable pattern of
breakdown of human performance may include fixation failure, which is the failure to adapt or revise
because of the diversion of attention and/or missing knowledge. Another predictable pattern is overreliance on familiar signs. 5 Some clinical work can become so ordinary that automatic behaviors
lead to unintended slips resulting in error.
What practitioners do with a great deal of accuracy in unpredictable and rapidly changing
situations is to adapt and reprioritize continuously. Given new cues or information, trade-offs are
made by practitioners to achieve best outcomes. For a practitioner with an overwhelming workload,
predictable adaptations include trading accuracy for speed, reducing performance criteria, shedding
and/or deferring tasks, and recruiting resources from other personnel.
Unpredictability, time pressures, ambiguity, and stress are characteristics common to the
healthcare environment. Understanding this complex environment is important so that systems are
designed to support practitioners in their work. Blaming individuals after near-miss and adverse
events precludes and often replaces the search for understanding of the complexity surrounding
situations. Successful change from a blame culture to a nonblame culture may be gained by
analyzing some of the more subtle organizational signs that indicate further attention is needed.

Subtle Signs of Blame
By now, most practitioners and organizations recognize that it does not solve a systems problem
to fire or discipline the staff person who made the error. However, blame can lurk in some
identifiable behavior patterns. Rather than blame an individual directly, these subtle signs of blame

still focus on individual behavior, do not address the systems issues, and accordingly do not produce
positive and lasting patient outcomes. Following are some identifiable subtle signs of blame.

Conclusion: Human Error
Root cause analyses are meant to address systems issues. It is tempting to conclude after a
review that human error was the culprit. The contributors that preceded the end point of human
error are the factors that will lead eventually to a future event. When human error is the conclusion,
nothing is proposed as needing further attention. Work complexity issues are not addressed. Not
only does focusing on human error as the conclusion reflect blame of individuals for failure, it also
precludes learning about how a similar event may be prevented in the future.

Obvious Error: Lazy Review
It is tempting to exclude certain errors or near misses from review because it is "obvious" what
caused the event. This tendency to jump to conclusions illustrates the concept of hindsight
bias. 6 Hindsight bias is the tendency to simplify the sequence of events after the fact. Although the
human tendency toward hindsight bias is apparent in every organization, increased awareness
before and during every review to prevent assignment of blame is crucial for learning. Accepting the
"obvious" conclusion as the final interpretation of an event misses the opportunity to understand
the event and improve the system and outcome.

Silo Review
A variation of hindsight bias is the silo review. Individual disciplines may understand the
complexity of their own work and apply nonblame approaches to learn from error. However,
because a practitioner may not understand the work of other disciplines in the same way, the
tendency is to resort to simplistic assumptions about work complexity in relation to other disciplines.

Failure to Transfer Knowledge
As an organization develops a culture of safety, some staff will apply the knowledge gained from
understanding work complexity to a specific patient safety initiative and implement system changes
successfully. However, the same staff may not transfer the principles of nonblame and work
complexity to the next patient safety situation. To the staff member, a different patient safety issue
may seem unrelated to the last project such that the underlying work complexity framework is not
applied.

Using New Language to Perpetuate Old Beliefs
The patient safety movement has a language. Although staff may learn patient safety terms and
theories, some try to use the new language to fit old behaviors. For example, the "Swiss cheese
model" adapted from Reason 7 is a valuable and commonly used representation to explain failure in
complex systems. In this model, the gaps, illustrated by the holes in the slices of Swiss cheese, line
up and result in an error. The slices illustrate different organizational points of defense or operations
such as staffing guidelines or the process for product purchasing decisions. When reviewing an
event, a staff member familiar with the Swiss cheese model may list multiple individuals as the
points of breakdown or gaps in the system rather than actual systems issues.

Re-education
When reviewing an event, one of the easiest fixes is to re-educate staff regarding a process. This
should not be the only improvement strategy done after a patient event for two reasons. First, reeducation regarding a policy or process assumes that the policy or process is correct. Second, reeducation obliquely implies that if the staff member had followed the policy properly, the event

would not have occurred. Without a work complexity analysis in relation to the patient event, both
assumptions are most likely incorrect.

Tighten up the Policy
Another popular way to address a systems issue is to "strengthen" an existing policy. Policies and
procedures are a necessary part of patient care. Policies are most effective when they take into
account work complexity and incorporate flexibility. Adding steps to a policy that do not reflect the
way work is performed will not necessarily reduce the likelihood of future similar errors.

Implications for Outcomes Management
Implementation of best practices, new procedures, new technology, and/or policies is dependent
on how well the change fits within the context of the real work of practitioners. Once change is
implemented, evaluation of whether the achievement of outcomes was successful, partially
successful, or a failure requires understanding of practitioner work in the context of real situations.
Next steps in the failed implementation of a change may have nothing to do with re-education but
more to do with how to support practitioners in dealing with the work change as a result of the new
process.
Learning about real work and achieving outcomes can be generated through reviews of near-miss
and adverse events when the focus of reviews is on systems, not individuals. Subtle signs of blame
may continue despite ongoing education regarding patient safety; recognition of subtle signs of
blame reflects self-awareness as an organization moves toward high patient safety reliability.
Organizational interventions should include ongoing reinforcement of rationale for nonblame
approaches and facilitation of focused system reviews after near-miss and adverse events. Most
importantly, understanding the real work environment is essential before any change is
implemented.
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